Understanding the Putin Crises

From the Donbas to Taiwan, Suwalki to Svalbard

The Beginning

Today, February 27th, is election day. Thousands have already cast ballots, and thousands more will in an election with an almost predestined outcome. I’m talking about Belarus, Europe’s infamous remaining totalitarian state. There, a simple proposition is presented to the public (at least facially): do you approve or reject the proposed amendments to the Constitution of Belarus? 

Elections in Belarus are not the best gauge of the public’s opinion, but rather show the absolute arrogance of its leader, Alexander Lukashenko; best described for most Americans as a bald, petty man from a faraway country of which we know nothing. Increasingly despised by the public, and fueled by a growing Russian fear of an uprising to overthrow him, this referendum elevates a body to be Lukashenko’s equal: The All-Belarus People’s Assembly. 

An unelected, appointed assembly of the fiscal-military elite of Belarus--the generals, business leaders (state or privately owned), intelligence services, loyal Lukashenko allies-- will become a new legislative body, with likely one purpose in mind. That purpose is finalizing the Union State while precipitating a moment of crisis for its necessity, on top of the heap of the Ukraine War. 

Starting only a few hours from now in Gomel, Belarus, the Russian and Ukrainian peace negotiators will likely sit at a long table on either end from the other. The Russians will exchange niceties, and no progress will be made. At some point in the hours or days thereafter, the Russian negotiators will stand up and walk out, Putin will go radio silent, and a new crisis will open in the so-called Suwalki Gap, the border region of Poland-Lithuania. 

The Suwalki Crisis and Hybrid Warfare 

In the wee hours of the night, the quiet shuffle of men clad in camouflage will fill the woods of the Suwalki Gap. It is a sparsely populated area, only 45 miles or so wide from the Belorussian border to the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation, a holdover from World War II peace. Some towns and villages dot the countryside, with railroads crisscrossing the border region of four states. Along the border of Belarus and Poland, there are refugee camps in the mud and muck, a product of Belarus' making from a few crises ago when they egged on desperate Syrians and others to charge Polish border guards. The men clad in camouflage will be a large part of the Belorussian Army, and as quietly as possible, they will set up positions all along the Suwalki Gap. Once they are in position, Russian jets will take to the sky from the various bases in Kaliningrad (likely most of the air wings, a large part of which is not in Ukraine, thus not destroying the measly air wings of their adversaries there), and some malnourished, traumatized Syrians will be marched in, with guns to their back, and start setting up tents. By the time the sun sets upon the national monuments of Washington D.C., the unthinkable will have just happened: NATO member countries will have had their national territory seized by a foreign power for the first time in its history. 

The Polish President will read the names of the border guards killed in the night to a press conference. The Lithuanian President will take unprecedented steps to clamp down on civil rights and mobilize for war, citing the already active state of emergency in the country. Media access to the Suwalki Gap will be restricted. While behind the scenes, NATO will argue at a fevered pitch for a response and the Polish and Lithuanian militaries will likely take unilateral action to this unprecedented threat by Belarus, their economically poor and bellicose neighbor. They will launch a quick offensive hoping to dislodge the foreign forces from their soil. Regardless, Belarus will be prepared for these actions by last year's war games premised on a fake country occupying a space much like the Suwalki Gap. This will likely fail, due to the Belorussians fortifications and planning, the Russian airpower, and the (somewhat) unexpected threat of mass refugee camps covering the front. 

Pictures and videos will emerge from the Belorussians of Polish and Lithuanian soldiers plowing through refugee camps as they assault Belorussian positions. Lukashenko will likely release these in a press conference, where he justifies the seizure as a logical response to the West’s declaration of war on Belarus. That declaration of war he refers to obviously isn’t a declaration of war--here, he’ll be mentioning the ejection of Russia and (likely) Belarus from SWIFT, the international transactions platform, Ukraine’s rejection of Belorussian commercial use of its ports, the microchip ban on Belarus and Russia, the end of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and likely many more lesser charges--but a declaration of war nonetheless in the minds of Lukashenko and Putin. 

At this point, Putin and the Russian state will act increasingly deranged. Arrests will ramp up. Assassinations will likely occur in the background. But all attempts to contact and get a response to the Suwalki Crisis will fall on deaf ears. Putin will not address any questions--radio silence--not even his much-beloved, televised cabinet meetings. Russian State TV will likely do its best to suppress any news of Suwalki until the anticipated unilateral offensive fails, at which point it will deplore the provocations by the West. The All-Belarus People’s Assembly at this point will have an emergency session, and likely tie even closer into the Russian Federation; They will potentially engage in sovereignty-destroying actions, such as authorizing Russian military personnel to make arrests in Belarus, authorizing dual citizenship of Russia and Belarus for all citizens, and perhaps some treaties of cooperation and friendship with Moscow which fall just short of an official Anschluss of the two countries. Russian soldiers in Minsk and the greater area will begin detaining dissidents and protestors, and establishing control on the domestic front so the Belarussian army can fortify further on the Suwalki Gap. 

A 21st Century Crisis & Failed Negotiations

After the tensest hours since the Cuban Missile Crisis, negotiations, either public or private will begin with Belarus, as Putin continues radio silence. NATO countries will be angered by this turn of events, as they all see Belarus as simply a vassal of Russia. These negotiations will go nowhere. Lukashenko will demand a full rollback of sanctions, a re-entry to SWIFT, Western neutrality in regards to the Ukraine Crisis, legally-binding and ironclad agreements on access to European ports, Nord Stream 2 to be allowed to operate, a poison-pill for the Polish that they would have to accept all Syrians in Suwalki and on the border as refugees, and then the cherry on top: the ejection of the Baltic countries from NATO. 

These terms will elicit laughter, then silence. Anger will build. The West may decide at this point that talk is cheap, to use the negotiations to buy time for a build-up and a new offensive. Lukashenko will expect this once the terms are delivered, and at the next meeting the West will say they are working out the details, that Poland needs to prepare for the refugees, other claptrap, etc. Then Lukashenko will hold another press conference. He will announce what his terms are to the world in a public fashion, and declare that President Biden has accepted these terms. Further, he will announce that Belarus obtained some form of an unconventional weapon--either biological, chemical, or nuclear. He will take no questions. 

As rage engulfs the media establishment in America, and military establishments across NATO are shocked with terror, the Biden administration will be forced to do an about-face. They will be forced to come up with a response that does not expose the military build-up, keeps Belarus at the negotiating table, and rejects the idea that they would even consider terms that would undermine NATO. Since President Biden, by design, can’t have all three after giving the statement and has no time to delay it, he will likely alienate Lukashenko regardless of response, minus a total capitulation to Belarus, a former Soviet Republic.  At this point, Lukashenko leaves the negotiating table. 

When these negotiations happen, make no mistake: they were designed to lead to failure. The outcome here is a win-win for Russia. Putin will have obtained the Union State (the proposed name of the confederation of Belarus and Russia) in all but name. If negotiations fail here, and the crisis settles into a new status quo, the Suwalki Gap offers a land-based alternative to Nord Stream 2, giving major economic power to Russia in terms of energy markets, and further making Russia contiguous to the Kaliningrad Oblast if you count the vassal state of Belarus. If the West accepted Lukashenko’s terms, it’s a wet dream for Putin; he gets nearly everything. 

But this crisis isn’t coming to an end, yet. 

Fire & Ice: The Svalbard Crisis and Arctic Ambitions

With active hostilities between Russia and its allies and NATO, the world will be at its most dangerous point ever. The night after Lukashenko left the negotiating table, Russian naval activities will increase in the Barents and North Seas, a near-rerun of some recent naval exercises but with one hitch: a naval invasion of Norway’s Svalbard Island. 

The first steps will be to cut all lines of communication between the Svalbard Archipelago and the rest of the world, a circumstance which has nearly beset the humble islands too recently to whisk away. After that, Russian marines will land in the major settlements. Another detachment will go to the old Soviet coal mining town, long since abandoned, and establish camps. Reminiscent of history, perhaps some of these soldiers will be from Donbas, just as the first Soviet settlers on Svalbard were nearly a century ago. Some 400 Russian people on the island of only 2,500 will create a small petty assembly, nominally petition for Russian assistance over the oppression of the Russian minority population (especially regarding the recent loss of voting rights of migrant Russians), and demilitarize the Svalbard Archipelago in accordance with the 1920 treaty which (the putschists & Putin will argue) is being grossly violated by the Norwegian government. 

A few days will go by before anyone even notices the Svalbard Seizure, unless a fisherman could escape the grasp of the Russian navy and make it to shore somewhere. The Russians will attempt to deflect as long as they can, until they announce the petition of the petty assembly, perhaps some fresh violations of their treaty obligations by Norway, and announce that a small Russian peacekeeping force was greeted by the Svalbarders with the goal of demilitarizing the Svalbard Archipelago from Norwegian aggression (let it be noted that Norway, too, is a NATO member). In keeping with Putin’s radio silence, all this news may well be announced by Lukashenko, acting as Putin’s mouthpiece to the world. 

A Second Round of Negotiations 

At this point, the next stages will likely involve cyberattacks and negotiations. Which comes first is anyone’s guess, but hopefully the world will be spared a week of technic torpor as Russia and NATO countries battle it out in cyberspace and in the critical systems that make the modern world possible. At this point, Putin will likely take over negotiations in order to see what settlement would be amenable to NATO and the West. 

Putin will simplify Lukashenko’s terms. No asks on sanctions, on SWIFT, on ports, or even Nord Stream 2. Putin will ask for only one thing in return for a rollback from Suwalki: the Baltics get ejected from NATO. For Svalbard, NATO will have to eject Norway from NATO, never accept the remaining Nordic countries, and likely some exclusive economic zone in the arctic around Svalbard, as well as a new round of Russian settlements on Svalbard, a space tracking facility (nominally for near-earth objects) on the islands, and perhaps a renegotiated treaty to govern the Svalbard Archipelago. 

At this point, the Biden administration has a few remaining options: a) launch new offensives to retake Suwalki and Svalbard, risk failure or worse, or risk victory and further escalation, b) give in on either Suwalki, or give in on Suwalki and Svalbard, c) all-out nuclear war. 

Presuming option c) is off the table for obvious reasons not needing analysis, option a) and option b) are the only real alternatives. Option a) risks a limited nuclear exchange, especially if the Russians feel they may lose in either Svalbard, are losing Suwalki, or even are facing minor offensives into Kaliningrad. Russia is unique for publicly stating that they have a nuclear first strike policy: Russia will use nuclear weapons preemptively if they feel they are losing Russian national territory. 

Returning to the Start

At this point, resistance in Ukraine will either stiffen with the potential end of the world, or collapse out of fear of the coming Putin terror. As we have seen the last few days, the Ukrainian army struggles to deal with even a portion of the Russian invasion force, and will likely lose any ability to contest the skies. If Kiev is encircled, its fall is likely not too far away. 

Another possible avenue of escalation is with the Transnistrians in Moldova. Transnistria is Yeltsin’s gift to the world, essentially a roadmap that Putin could replay with some edits as he did in Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine from 2014 to now. Yet, it also offers a new axis for advance into Ukraine, as well as a staging ground for intervention in Moldova. 

Transnistrians long complained of the pro-Romanian orientation of the Moldovan government, and with this area being one of the oldest areas of separatist tension, the pretext barely needs to be provided in Putin’s eyes. While Moldova is not a NATO member, Romania is a part of NATO. While Romania pledged not to commit troops to the Ukraine War, an intervention into Chisinau may change the circumstance in their eyes in terms of military force. This option can further break NATO due to the Gagauz peoples in the south of Moldova, composing an autonomous region of the country populated by the Turkic ethnic group. Some false flags attacks on Gagauz villages by Moldovan armed forces could at least make Turkey queasy, and if Romania intervenes to defend their kinfolk and calls for assistance that queasiness may be the end of NATO. A persuasive Putin may even sway an adventurous Erdogan’s approval in hopes of more influence in a tri-national, federalized Moldova or as part of a larger settlement to woo over the Turks to buy Russian gas and other products. 

Come What May

The outcome by this point is difficult to say. At this point, NATO would likely be trying to minimize the losses to just three NATO member countries and international embarrassment, and hopefully no use of nuclear weapons. The worst case, short of thermonuclear armageddon, is a complete collapse of NATO and the entire Western security architecture. 

Putin, on the other hand, will win with all options. Offensive operations in the arctic, with a modernized Russian Arctic Fleet, is dangerous for the US Navy. An aircraft carrier could join the Titanic with one loose iceberg; such an outcome sounds preposterous, but the US has essentially no real icebreaker capabilities, while the Russians have dozens of nuclear-powered icebreakers. Going into the spring, the risk of melting loose icebergs is at its highest, giving the Russians a distinct advantage. In Suwalki, the risk of nuclear escalation is immense, with chemical or biological weapons a near certainty with a full assault on Belorussian and Russian positions, aside from Western media outrage over the dead refugees which will inevitably be the byproduct of any assault. 

While the seizure of Suwalki would break NATO in the east, nominally it would appear to many western publics as simply some unoccupied grasslands: why risk World War III for some occupied woods & railroads? Similarly, even with success in Svalbard, and no nuclear weapons use, why have potentially thousands of Americans die for a group of arctic islands and icebergs, doomsday seed vaults aside?  

If the Biden administration gives in to Putin’s demand on Suwalki, he can be free to invade the Baltics at a later date, thus securing his much-desired land-based alternative to Nord Stream 2. An agreement on Svalbard is made difficult by Putin’s arctic ambitions, endeavoring to gain all the mineral and resource claims made accessible by accelerating climatic changes in the Arctic Circle. Regardless, a positive outcome on either Suwalki or both will be a major win for Putin’s Russia, and more importantly set up a foreign policy lay-up for later in the year that will reverberate for decades if not centuries to come. 

Toward the World Island

With the Baltics out of NATO, Ukraine battered if not outright conquered, the powers of the world will feel emboldened. By the middle to end of this week, pending the scale and level of distress of the Russian financial system to come, a Chinese bailout of Russia may well be in order. Whether in the public eye or in private boardrooms of state banks and corporations is an open question. This bailout could ensure the continued rumbling of the Russian war machine in Ukraine, and finance the coming crisis moments the Putin-Lukashenko pact aims to commit. 

As China has already done, they have highlighted the hypocrisies of American denunciation, like presenting to the world a list of countries the US has bombed since 1945. Early in the crisis they shipped wheat to Russia as the price of the commodity hit multi-year highs, an act of good faith from Xi to Putin that highlights the cooperation. In exchange for the bailout, there will be both public and private concessions. For example, Russia will enter into some form of a financial transactions platform with the Chinese, in addition to building their own system to the best of their ability. Perhaps some form of deference in Central Asia could be guaranteed; arguably, the signs of this arrangement are already there in the just passed crisis in Kazakhstan, as well as Kazakhstan’s continued refusal to recognize the Donbass people’s republics, and its refusal to send any soldiers to the front in Ukraine up until now. The recent resignation of the former president’s daughter from the legislature also poses questions, even if for nominally innocent reasons such as charity work and whatnot. 

The main concession would be agreement over further integrating their economies in spite of Western sanctions, and to coordinate their military and foreign policy for a purpose. That purpose is simple: launching a simultaneous assault on the Baltic countries by Russian armies in the West and an invasion of Taiwan in lightning fashion by China in the East. If they want to time this assault for maximum political leverage, they’d aim for the fall: for the mother of all October surprises. 

At best, the American military is prepared for two medium-scale military conflicts at the same time or one major conflict. These two invasions by Russia and China would constitute at least two major conflicts on the world stage, involving the same sort of messy guarantees, with no real domestic political backing, that got the US dragged into and humiliated in Ukraine. In Taiwan, it goes back to World War II and the frozen conflict of the Chinese Civil War. In the Baltics it will go back to NATO’s failure to deal with Suwalki and Svalbard in a way that leaves no loose ends; regardless of whether a settlement is reached in Suwalki, or a Russian-Belorussian force remains standing across from NATO lines, communicating with binoculars and rifle scopes, Putin could attempt this assault and put the final nail in the coffin as to whether NATO will defend the Baltics or leave them as we left Ukraine for the slaughter. 

Regardless of whether President Biden caves to this mother of all October surprises, or at least tries to put up a fight--and risk nuclear and cyber escalation--to save himself and his party in the midterms, he could be looking at history making losses. While there is an upward bound on how bad you can lose the Senate, the losses in the House can be total. With that comes the risk of Speaker of the House Donald Trump. With Trump as Speaker of the House, he could make the legislative body’s one task a simple thing: impeach and convict President Biden and Vice President Harris over his bogus fraud allegations of 2020. 

Depending on the Senate, this turn of events may deliver the unthinkable, which hopefully remains in the land of fantasy: a President Donald Trump by the summer or fall of 2023. At that point, he could break the NATO establishment by simply coming to a friendly understanding of the Russian and Chinese actions, fully accepting any seizures or arrangements they set up with their vassals across the world, in exchange for trade concessions to the US. This sort of deal, and whatever variation of it which may come, would break NATO and functionally make it toothless on the world stage. 

Such bullying of a presidential administration into oblivion from such a devastating series of events would degrade American power to a level not seen for decades, if not a century. The West would likely cease to the West, but rather becoming dominated by whatever rightists and putschists run the street and are willing to shoot enough people to get their way; a re-enactment of the Soviet collapse in situ in every Western capital, with the hopes of Euromaidan-style events to save the system, and fears of Yeltsin-style leaders aiming tank guns at legislative assemblies to end any sort of a peaceful transition. Our future may be a Russian-guaranteed time machine to 1992 or 2014 for half the civilized world, for the world’s public to watch, see, and choose which dilapidated DeLorean to ride.